Indiana's New Law

[Liahona]

Should DCI boycott ALL states that have similar laws. 20 States have almost the exact same law on the books. They were all based off of the 1993 federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

If it's an issue in Indiana, shouldn't it also be an issue in Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia?

Just some food for thought.

Indiana's law is quite different, and worse...it places the burden of fighting discrimination on its victims...very sad IMO.

[cowtown]

Should DCI boycott ALL states that have similar laws. 20 States have almost the exact same law on the books. They were all based off of the 1993 federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

If it's an issue in Indiana, shouldn't it also be an issue in Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia?

Just some food for thought.

Apples and oranges, the laws are different in the other states or have other laws to counteract them

Indiana’s law is unique

[cowtown]

Which is entirely possible. Another "gray area" laws like this create.

Maybe I'm not a devout anything, but just don't like gays. I can claim my refusal of service is based on "deeply held" religious beliefs. How does one prove another's belief is not legitimate?

That’s what I meant when I said it grants special rights to certain religions

[OldBones]

Should DCI boycott ALL states that have similar laws. 20 States have almost the exact same law on the books. They were all based off of the 1993 federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

If it's an issue in Indiana, shouldn't it also be an issue in Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia?

Just some food for thought.

I was kind of thinking this way. But my comment goes a little deeper.

With all this protesting about DCI holding finals and moving their headquarters out on Indiana, what about corps who remain in states that have a similar law.

Illinois has this law, do the fans of the Cavies and Phantom not support them, how about the Colts, do we boycott their shows, how about the Cadets in PA, Crossmen in Texas, Academy in AZ, 7th Regiment in Connecticut (BTW - the FIRST state in institute this law) all the new corps starting up in Florida and Louisana. We can go on and on.

If the answer is no, then why is all this all put on the shoulders of DCI?

I respect the opinions of many people here, but if the cry is just for DCI, why not each individual corps?

If the answer is years established, Cadets bebunk that with their rebranding from Garfield to Bergen County to Allentown PA. Crossmen reestablished from PA to Texas. No loss of identity for either one.

[chaddyt]

Chaddyt I hope no one quotes you out of context.

:o

Quoting people out of context has never happened in the history of Teh Internets.

[scv_chuck]

It seems the Texas law has very similar wording to Indiana.

I propose that DCI move the Southwest Championship from San Antonio to Denver!

[cowtown]

Should DCI boycott ALL states that have similar laws. 20 States have almost the exact same law on the books. They were all based off of the 1993 federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

If it's an issue in Indiana, shouldn't it also be an issue in Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia?

Just some food for thought.

I was kind of thinking this way. But my comment goes a little deeper.

With all this protesting about DCI holding finals and moving their headquarters out on Indiana, what about corps who remain in states that have a similar law.

Illinois has this law, do the fans of the Cavies and Phantom not support them, how about the Colts, do we boycott their shows, how about the Cadets in PA, Crossmen in Texas, Academy in AZ, 7th Regiment in Connecticut (BTW - the FIRST state in institute this law) all the new corps starting up in Florida and Louisana. We can go on and on.

If the answer is no, then why is all this all put on the shoulders of DCI?

I respect the opinions of many people here, but if the cry is just for DCI, why not each individual corps?

If the answer is years established, Cadets bebunk that with their rebranding from Garfield to Bergen County to Allentown PA. Crossmen reestablished from PA to Texas. No loss of identity for either one.

It seems the Texas law has very similar wording to Indiana.

I propose that DCI move the Southwest Championship from San Antonio to Denver!

There’s a factual dispute about the new Indiana law. It is called a “Religious Freedom Restoration Act,” like the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, passed in 1990. Thus a number of its defenders have claimed it is really the same law. Here, for example, is the Weekly Standard’s John McCormack: “Is there any difference between Indiana's law and the federal law? Nothing significant.” I am not sure what McCormack writer was thinking; but even my old employer, The Washington Post, seems to believe that if a law has a similar title as another law, they must be identical. “Indiana is actually soon to be just one of 20 states with a version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA,” the Post’s Hunter Schwarz wrote, linking to this map created by the National Conference of State Legislatures.

The problem with this statement is that, well, it’s false. That becomes clear when you read and compare those tedious state statutes. If you do that, you will find that the Indiana statute has two features the federal RFRA—and most state RFRAs—do not. First, the Indiana law explicitly allows any for-profit business to assert a right to “the free exercise of religion.” The federal RFRA doesn’t contain such language, and neither does any of the state RFRAs except South Carolina’s; in fact, Louisiana and Pennsylvania, explicitly exclude for-profit businesses from the protection of their RFRAs.

The new Indiana statute also contains this odd language: “A person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened, by a violation of this chapter may assert the violation or impending violation as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding, regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a party to the proceeding.” (My italics.) Neither the federal RFRA, nor 18 of the 19 state statutes cited by the Post, says anything like this; only the Texas RFRA, passed in 1999, contains similar language.

What these words mean is, first, that the Indiana statute explicitly recognizes that a for-profit corporation has “free exercise” rights matching those of individuals or churches. A lot of legal thinkers thought that idea was outlandish until last year’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, in which the Court’s five conservatives interpreted the federal RFRA to give some corporate employers a religious veto over their employees’ statutory right to contraceptive coverage.

Second, the Indiana statute explicitly makes a business’s “free exercise” right a defense against a private lawsuit by another person, rather than simply against actions brought by government. Why does this matter? Well, there’s a lot of evidence that the new wave of “religious freedom” legislation was impelled, at least in part, by a panic over a New Mexico state-court decision, Elane Photography v. Willock. In that case, a same-sex couple sued a professional photography studio that refused to photograph the couple’s wedding. New Mexico law bars discrimination in “public accommodations” on the basis of sexual orientation. The studio said that New Mexico’s RFRA nonetheless barred the suit; but the state’s Supreme Court held that the RFRA did not apply “because the government is not a party.”

Remarkably enough, soon after, language found its way into the Indiana statute to make sure that no Indiana court could ever make a similar decision. Democrats also offered the Republican legislative majority a chance to amend the new act to say that it did not permit businesses to discriminate; they voted that amendment down.

[url=http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/what-makes-indianas-religious-freedom-law-different/388997/[/url]

[garfield]

[url=http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/what-makes-indianas-religious-freedom-law-different/388997/[/url]

Ah, I see you, too, are a proficient Google surfer.

I'll bet you have a subscription to the Atlantic. But I know you've cited other references here that back up your claims:

That’s what I meant when I said it grants special rights to certain religions

Oh, wait...

It's OK, You're angry and need to lash out. I get it.

It's a well-worn script, not surprising.

Carry on, but caution with the personal invectives. You don't need to "see it" that your actions are bullying and personal, only the mods do. And on here the mods ARE the law of the land.

Edited March 31, 2015 by garfield

[JimF-LowBari]

"First, the Indiana law explicitly allows any for-profit business to assert a right to “the free exercise of religion.” The federal RFRA doesn’t contain such language, and neither does any of the state RFRAs except South Carolina’s; in fact, Louisiana and Pennsylvania, explicitly exclude for-profit businesses from the protection of their RFRAs"

There's one missing piece. But how does this fit with the groups that do/do not have their rights protected under state civil rights laws. For PA, as stated, a for profit business is not protected under RFRA. But homosexuals can be fired without any claim to religious belief so RFRA does not come into the picture.

Edited March 31, 2015 by JimF-LowBari

[Mello Dude]

Chapter 9. Religious Freedom Restoration

Sec. 1. This chapter applies to all governmental entity statutes, ordinances, resolutions, executive or administrative orders, regulations, customs, and usages, including the implementation or application thereof, regardless of whether they were enacted, adopted, or initiated before, on, or after July 1, 2015.

Sec. 2. A governmental entity statute, ordinance, resolution, executive or administrative order, regulation, custom, or usage may not be construed to be exempt from the application of this chapter unless a state statute expressly exempts the statute, ordinance, resolution, executive or administrative order, regulation, custom, or usage from the application of this chapter by citation to this chapter.

Sec. 3. (a) The following definitions apply throughout this section: (1) "Establishment Clause" refers to the part of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Indiana prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion. (2) "Granting", used with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions. (b) This chapter may not be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address the Establishment Clause. © Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, does not constitute a violation of this chapter.

Sec. 4. As used in this chapter, "demonstrates"means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.

Sec. 5. As used in this chapter, "exercise of religion" includes any exercise of religion,whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.

Sec. 6. As used in this chapter, "governmental entity" includes the whole or any part of a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, official, or other individual or entity acting under color of law of any of the following: (1) State government. (2) A political subdivision (as defined in IC 36-1-2-13). (3) An instrumentality of a governmental entity described in subdivision(1) or (2), including a state educational institution, a body politic, a body corporate and politic, or any other similar entity established by law.

Sec. 7. As used in this chapter, "person" includes the following: (1) An individual. (2) An organization, a religious society, a church, a body of communicants, or a group organized and operated primarily for religious purposes. (3) A partnership, a limited liability company, a corporation, a company, a firm, a society, a joint-stock company, an unincorporated association, or another entity that: (A) may sue and be sued; and (B) exercises practices that are compelled or limited by a system of religious belief held by: (i) an individual; or (ii) the individuals; who have control and substantial ownership of the entity, regardless of whether the entity is organized and operated for profit or nonprofit purposes.

Sec. 8. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. (b) A governmental entity may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

Sec. 9. A person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened, by a violation of this chapter may assert the violation or impending violation as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding, regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a party to the proceeding. If the relevant governmental entity is not a party to the proceeding, the governmental entity has an unconditional right to intervene in order to respond to the person's invocation of this chapter.

Sec. 10. (a) If a court or other tribunal in which a violation of this chapter is asserted in conformity with section 9 of this chapter determines that: (1) the person's exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened; and (2) the governmental entity imposing the burden has not demonstrated that application of the burden to the person: (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest; the court or other tribunal shall allow a defense against any party and shall grant appropriate relief against the governmental entity. (b) Relief against the governmental entity may include any of the following: (1) Declaratory relief or an injunction or mandate that prevents, restrains, corrects, or abates the violation of this chapter. (2) Compensatory damages. © In the appropriate case,the court or other tribunal also may award all or part of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees, to a person that prevails against the governmental entity under this chapter.

Sec. 11. This chapter is not intended to, and shall not be construed or interpreted to, create a claim or private cause of action against any private employer by any applicant, employee, or former employee.